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2012, ?? (?), 1–15
Multiple roles for majority versus minority
5 source status on persuasion when source status
follows the message
Javier Horcajo1, Pablo Brin˜ol1, and Richard E. Petty2
1Department of Psychology, Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid,
Madrid, Spain
10 2Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus,
OH, USA
This research shows that numerical majority (vs minority) status of the source
can affect persuasion by different processes when induced after message
processing. Specifically, we argue that source status affects persuasion by
15 serving as a simple peripheral validity cue under low-elaboration conditions,
and by validating thoughts—a metacognitive process—under high-elaboration
conditions. In the present study extent of elaboration was manipulated (high
vs low), and then participants received a persuasive message composed of
either strong or weak arguments that were presented by a source in the
20 numerical majority or minority. This source status information was introduced
following the message. We predicted and found that, under high-elaboration
conditions the majority source increased the argument quality effect on
attitudes in response to the message compared to the minority source. In
contrast, under low-elaboration conditions the information regarding source
25 status served as a simple peripheral validity cue, with the majority source
leading to more persuasion compared to the minority source regardless of
argument quality. Thus the present results provide the first evidence for
moderation of different effects for majority/minority influence when the
numerical status of the source follows message processing.
30 Keywords: Persuasion; Source status; Minority influence; Attitude change.
Research on majority/minority influence has shown that sources in the
numerical majority often exert greater influence than sources in the
numerical minority (e.g., Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Wood, Lundgren,
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35 Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). For example, if people were to
learn that 86% of others endorsed a proposal, they would be more likely to
agree with it than if only 14% endorsed it. However, under some
circumstances, minority endorsement can be more influential both on
direct measures (e.g., Baker & Petty, 1994; Martin & Hewstone, 2003) and
40 especially when attitude change is assessed with indirect, latent, or
private measures (e.g., Crano & Chen, 1998; Moscovici, 1980; Mugny &
Pe´rez, 1991).
In accord with contemporary multi-process theories of persuasion such as
the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the
45 heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989),
research shows that majority/minority source status can operate through
different processes depending on the overall likelihood of elaboration people
are willing and able to expend in processing persuasive communications
(e.g., Tormala, Petty, & DeSensi, 2010; see also Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990;
50 Maass & Clark, 1983). Nevertheless, although prior research on majority/
minority influence has proposed different underlying processes that are
likely to affect attitude change in different situations, so far these different
mechanisms have appeared mostly in different studies, using different
participants, manipulations and measures (see Martin & Hewstone, 2008,
55 for a review).
In one notable exception Martin, Hewstone, and Martin (2007)
manipulated the level of elaboration (low, intermediate, and high) within
the same experimental design to test ELM predictions about the multiple
roles for majority vs minority source status and found that when either
60 motivational (Study 1) or ability (Study 2) factors encouraged low message
elaboration, there was heuristic acceptance of the majority position without
detailed message processing. However, when elaboration was not con-
strained by motivational or cognitive variables to be high or low (i.e.,
intermediate level of elaboration), source status affected how much thinking
65 people did about the message. Specifically, minority source status increased
careful processing, as revealed by greater argument quality effects shown for
minority rather than majority sources. Finally, when elaboration was high,
source status did not have a consistent effect on attitude change across
studies, but rather persuasion was mainly a function of the quality of
70 arguments in the message (see, Erb, Bohner, Schma¨lzle, & Rank, 1998, for
an exception showing that under high thinking conditions, sources status
can bias the direction of the thoughts generated in response to the message).
As in most of the literature on majority/minority source status and
persuasion, Martin and colleagues (2007) focused exclusively on cases where
75 source status was manipulated prior to receipt of the persuasive message.
However, recent research has shown that source information can also affect
attitude change when it is provided after the persuasive message.
2 HORCAJO, BRIN˜OL, PETTY
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Specifically, Horcajo, Petty, and Brin˜ol (2010) demonstrated that the
placement of source status information is an important moderating factor in
80 the domain of attitude change. Specifically, the timing of source status
information (prior to vs after message processing) is relevant to under-
standing the different effects and multiple processes that can produce
attitude change, as well as the potential consequences for attitude strength
resulting from those multiple processes (for an illustration applied to source
85 credibility, see, Tormala, Brin˜ol, & Petty, 2007).
In the previous research conducted by Horcajo and colleagues (2010)
participants received a persuasive message composed of either strong (i.e.,
convincing) or weak (i.e., flawed) arguments that was presented by a
majority or a minority source. When majority/minority source status
90 information was introduced preceding the persuasive message, the majority
source decreased the argument quality effect on attitudes, in line with prior
research (e.g., Martin et al., 2007) and consistent with the idea that majority
source status can affect the extent of message processing by validating the
opinion that the source presents (i.e., if the source’s opinion is valid, there is
95 less need to process the message). In contrast, when source status
information followed the persuasive message, majority source increased
the argument quality effect on attitudes, consistent with the idea that source
status can validate one’s own thoughts in response to the message. In order
to demonstrate the causal role of timing, in a third study Horcajo and
100 colleagues isolated the placement of the source status induction by
manipulating the timing (prior to vs after message processing) within the
same experiment. The results revealed that majority source increased
persuasion to compelling arguments (compared to minority source) when
source information was introduced following the message (consistent with
105 validating positive thoughts to strong arguments), but decreased persuasion
when introduced preceding the message (consistent with reduced processing
of strong arguments). Taken together, these studies showed that the
placement of the source status information (before or after the message)
produced different results through different processes (reducing elaboration
110 vs validating thoughts, respectively).
The initial research by Horcajo and colleagues (2010) was important in
introducing the novel idea that sources in the numerical majority (vs
minority) can operate by influencing the confidence with which people hold
their thoughts about the persuasive message when source status information
115 follows the message processing. This process is called self-validation (Petty,
Brin˜ol, & Tormala, 2002). Briefly stated, the key notion of self-validation is
that generating (positive or negative) thoughts in response to a persuasive
proposal is not sufficient for these thoughts to have a (positive or negative)
impact on attitudes. Rather, one must also have sufficient confidence in the
120 validity of those thoughts. Confidence is a subjective sense of conviction
SOURCE STATUS AFTER MESSAGE 3
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about the validity of one’s beliefs, opinions, goals, or whatever mental
content is active (Brin˜ol & Petty, 2009; Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995). Thus
thoughts that are not perceived as valid are mentally discarded. In line with
the self-validation hypothesis, when source status is induced after message
125 processing it cannot affect the extent of message processing, but it should
affect attitude change by influencing the extent to which people rely on the
thoughts they have already generated to the message. Thinking about the
validity of one’s thoughts involves thinking about thinking, a form of
second-order cognition or metacognition (see Brin˜ol & DeMarree, 2012;
130 Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998). Thus, unlike previous mechanisms of
attitude change that focus on first-order cognition (i.e., direction and
amount of thoughts), this new process emphasizes second-order or
metacognition. Applied to majority/minority influence, the self-validation
hypothesis proposes that the numerical status of the source can affect
135 message recipients’ confidence in their thoughts to the persuasive proposal
rather than affecting how much they think or in what (positive or negative)
direction they generate thoughts, especially when source status information
follows the message processing.
As noted, previous research on source status and self-validation
140 (Horcajo et al., 2010) showed that majority source status can increase
the confidence with which recipients held their thoughts compared to
minority source status. When the thoughts were positive (in response to
strong arguments), majority source status was associated with more
persuasion than minority source status because people relied more on their
145 positive thoughts generated in response to the convincing message. On the
other hand, when thoughts were negative (in response to the message
containing weak arguments), the confidence generated by the majority
source status was associated with less persuasion compared to minority
source status.
150 Although this initial research provided clear support for the meta-
cognitive effects of majority/minority source status when induced after
information processing, it did not examine whether self-validation is
invariably the mechanism by which majority/minority source status affects
persuasion when introduced after a message or whether other possibilities
155 remain. Notably, meta-cognitive processes such as self-validation should
occur mainly when thinking about the message is high (Brin˜ol & Petty,
2009). There are at least two reasons for this. First, for self-validation
processes to matter, people need to have some thoughts to validate, which is
more likely when thinking is high than low. Second, people need some
160 motivation and ability not only to think at a primary level of cognition, but
also to think and care about their own thoughts (secondary cognition). Thus
the present research aimed to provide the first evidence that self-validation
processes for majority/minority influence effects are confined to conditions
4 HORCAJO, BRIN˜OL, PETTY
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in which elaboration is high, but that other processes operate when
165 elaboration is low.
Specifically, under low thinking conditions, source status is predicted to
influence attitudes by serving as a peripheral cue even when introduced after
receiving the persuasive message. According to multi-process models such as
the ELM and the HSM, when elaboration is low, variables affect attitudes
170 through peripheral route mechanisms or heuristic processing (e.g., the
source serves as quick heuristic to persuasion or resistance). For example,
people might simply accept or reject a majority versus minority message
because the position is assumed to be valid or invalid (due to the high or low
consensus). As noted before, when thinking is low, simple peripheral cue
175 effects for majority/minority sources have been observed when source status
has preceded a message. This simple main effect of source status has
generally been explained as majority source status invoking a simple rule
that would lead people to agree with the majority position to satisfy their
desire to belong to the majority group, as identification with a majority is
180 desirable, at least at a public/direct level (e.g., Mackie, 1987; Martin et al.,
2007). Furthermore, this finding is compatible with much prior research on
the operation of peripheral cues processes (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984;
Tormala, Petty, & Brin˜ol, 2002). However, no prior research has examined
whether majority/minority source status can serve as a simple cue when
185 presented following the persuasive message. When following a message,
source status cannot influence how much thinking takes place because
thinking has already occurred, but it should still be capable of serving as a
simple cue to validity thereby affecting attitudes.
Therefore the primary goals of the present work are to (1) examine the
190 different processes (self-validation vs peripheral cue) by which source status
can operate when introduced after the persuasive message, and (2) specify
the conditions under which these processes are most likely to operate. In
order to address these goals we conducted an experiment in which we first
manipulated the level of elaboration (high vs low) using a classic
195 manipulation of motivation to think. Then we assigned participants to
receive a persuasive message composed of either strong or weak arguments
on a relatively novel topic. After participants read the message information,
source status was manipulated by attributing the message to a source in the
numerical majority or minority. Finally, participants reported their attitudes
200 toward the proposal.
In line with previous research on self-validation, we predicted that in the
high-elaboration conditions the majority source would increase reliance on
thoughts compared to the minority source, increasing the impact of
argument quality on attitudes. In contrast, in the low-elaboration conditions
205 we hypothesized that the majority source would increase persuasion
compared to the minority source regardless of argument quality.
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The latter effect is consistent with the operation of a peripheral cue process.
Thus, in accord with ELM, self-validation and peripheral cue processes
would operate at the opposite extremes of the elaboration continuum (Petty
210 & Brin˜ol, 2012).
METHOD
Participants and design
A total of 144 undergraduate psychology students at the Universidad
Auto´noma de Madrid (Spain) participated in partial fulfillment of a course
215 requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2
(elaboration: high vs low) 2 (argument quality: strong vs weak) 2 (source
status: majority vs minority) between-participants factorial design.
Procedure
Participants began this study by reading a cover story that led them to
220 believe they were taking part in a study designed to examine potential
changes in a university’s institutional color. In order to manipulate the
extent of elaboration some participants were told that the proposal referred
to their university whereas others were told it referred to another Spanish
university. Then approximately half of the participants were randomly
225 assigned to receive a persuasive message containing strong arguments in
favor of using green as the institutional color for the university, and the
others received a message containing weak arguments about this color. After
reading the message participants were informed that a previous survey on
campus revealed that a majority or a minority of students already supported
230 the proposal of the message about green becoming the institutional color.
The information was framed so they thought they received some of the
arguments generated previously by those students. Finally participants
reported their attitudes toward the persuasive proposal, and they rated the
extent to which they had paid attention to the proposal. After completing
235 these measures they were debriefed and thanked.
Independent variables
Elaboration. Half of the participants were told that they were helping
with research designed to assess possible changes in the institutional color of
240 their own university (high thinking condition), whereas the other half of the
participants were told that they were participating in research designed to
assess possible changes in the institutional color of another remote university
(low thinking condition; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). In addition, as university
color is not a very familiar topic for most students in Spain, participants in
245 the high-elaboration condition were explicitly encouraged to think carefully
6 HORCAJO, BRIN˜OL, PETTY
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about the information provided by telling those participants that they were
in a selected sample of students whose responses would directly affect the
university’s evaluation of the issue; thus their responses would be very
important in their university’s ultimate decision about the issue. In contrast,
250 participants in the low-elaboration condition were told that they were in a
sample of students being asked to complete the survey (e.g., Tormala et al.,
2002).
Argument quality. The persuasive message that participants received
contained either strong or weak arguments in favor of using green as the
255 institutional color for the university. This manipulation was designed to
affect the profile of thoughts (favorable or unfavorable) if people were
thinking about the arguments carefully (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The
arguments selected were adopted from previous research and have been
shown to produce the appropriate pattern of cognitive responding. That is,
260 when people were instructed to think about the message information, the
strong arguments elicited significantly more favorable thoughts toward the
proposal than the weak arguments did (Horcajo et al., 2010, Expt. 2). Thus
the strong arguments in favor of the institutional color highlighted, for
instance, ‘‘psychology research found that the performance and satisfaction
265 of everybody would improve if green was the color adopted by the
university,’’ ‘‘increasing creativity in students,’’ and ‘‘inducing higher levels
of mental concentration.’’ In contrast, the weak arguments in favor of this
color pointed to, for instance, ‘‘green traditionally has been defended to
parents as a solid institutional color when choosing a university for their
270 children’’ and ‘‘green is the color of essential elements relevant to education
such as chalkboards.’’
Source status. Following the message, participants were led to believe
that the message they read came from a source in the numerical majority or
minority (i.e., 86% versus 14% of their fellow students agreed with the
275 message; see Horcajo et al., 2010).
Dependent variables
Attitudes. Participants’ attitudes toward the advocacy were assessed
using five 9-point (1–9) semantic differential scales (i.e., in favor/against,
280 like/dislike, positive/negative, innovative/not innovative, modern/old-fash-
ioned) on which they rated the color policy. Ratings on the different scales
were highly correlated (a¼ .88) and were averaged to create a composite
measure of attitudes toward the color green. Responses to the attitude scales
were scored so that higher values represented more favorable attitudes about
285 the color green being adopted by the university.
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Manipulation check for attention. Finally we asked participants to rate
the extent to which they had paid attention to the proposal. Specifically,
amount of attention was rated on two different scales: a 9-point scale
assessing participants’ level of attention, anchored with ‘‘low attention paid’’
290 (1) and ‘‘high attention paid’’ (9), and another 5-point scale, anchored at
‘‘not at all attentive right now’’ (1) and ‘‘very attentive right now’’ (5).
Ratings on these two different scales were correlated (r¼ .43; p5 .001), so
they were combined to create a composite measure of the extent of attention.
We z-transformed each of these two ratings scales and then averaged them.
295 Higher scores represented a greater extent of attention.
RESULTS
The dependent measures were submitted to a 2 (elaboration: high or
low) 2 (argument quality: strong or weak) 2 (source status: majority or
minority) analysis of variance (ANOVA).
300 Manipulation check for attention
As expected, the only significant effect to emerge from the 2 2 2
ANOVA on attention was a main effect of the manipulation of elaboration,
F(1, 136)¼ 5.50, p¼ .02, showing that this manipulation was successful.
That is, high-elaboration participants showed significantly higher values on
305 the self-reported attention paid to the message (M¼ .15, SD¼ .81) than did
low-elaboration participants (M¼.15, SD¼ .85).
Attitudes
Consistent with our hypotheses, results of the 2 2 2 ANOVA on
attitudes revealed a significant three-way ElaborationArgument
310 Quality Source Status interaction, F(1, 136)¼ 11.04, p¼ .001. To examine
the basis of this interaction we analyzed the results at the two levels of
manipulated elaboration. Consistent with our self-validation hypothesis, a
two-way interaction between argument quality and source status was
observed under high-elaboration conditions, F(1, 68)¼ 9.20, p¼ .003. As
315 depicted in Figure 1 (top panel), this interaction demonstrated that the effect
of argument quality on attitudes was restricted to majority source status
participants. That is, for majority source status participants, those who
received the strong arguments had significantly more favorable attitudes
toward the proposal (M¼ 6.12, SD¼ 1.47) than did those who received the
320 weak arguments (M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.78), t(32)¼2.83, p¼ .008. However,
minority source status participants did not show a significant difference in
attitudes if they received the message composed of strong arguments
8 HORCAJO, BRIN˜OL, PETTY
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(M¼ 4.73, SD¼ 2.04) or the message composed of weak arguments
(M¼ 5.68, SD¼ 1.71), t(36)¼ 1.55, p¼ .12.
325 Viewed differently, this interaction revealed that for the strong message,
participants in the majority source status condition showed significantly
more favorable attitudes (M¼ 6.12, SD¼ 1.47) than did those in the
minority source status condition (M¼ 4.73, SD¼ 2.04), t(34)¼2.33,
p¼ .02. In contrast, for participants who received the weak message, those
330 in the majority source status condition showed less favorable attitudes
HIGH ELABORATION
LOW ELABORATION
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Figure 1. Attitudes as a function of elaboration, argument quality, and source status.
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(M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.78) than did those in the minority source status condition
(M¼ 5.68, SD¼ 1.71), t(34)¼ 1.95, p¼ .05.
Moreover, consistent with our peripheral cue hypothesis, for low-
elaboration participants, there was only a significant main effect of Source
335 Status, F(1, 68)¼ 4.63, p¼ .03, with more favorable attitudes reported in
response to the majority source (M¼ 6.00, SD¼ 1.43) rather than the
minority source (M¼ 5.25, SD¼ 1.60; see Figure 1, bottom panel). For this
low elaboration condition, as expected, no significant Argument
Quality Source Status interaction emerged, F(1, 68)¼ 2.45, p¼ .12.
340 DISCUSSION
Most of prior research on majority/minority influence has manipulated
source status information prior to message receipt, finding that the
numerical source status of a message can influence attitudes through
different mechanisms depending on the message recipients’ level of
345 elaboration. However, recent research has also shown that majority/
minority source status can influence judgment even when source status is
manipulated after message processing, though the mechanism uncovered
was different from any that had been seen when the source status preceded
the message (i.e., self-validation). The present research analyzed two
350 different processes by which majority/minority source status could affect
persuasion as a function of elaboration when source status information
followed rather than preceded message information.
Specifically, on the one hand, under a high-elaboration level an
interaction between argument quality and source status was observed. For
355 majority source status participants, those who received the strong arguments
had significantly more favorable attitudes toward the proposal than did
those who received the weak arguments. However, minority source status
participants did not show a significant difference in attitudes if they received
the message composed of strong arguments or the message composed of
360 weak arguments. This is consistent with a self-validation explanation
according to which source status can influence the extent to which people
rely on their positive and negative thoughts presumably generated to a
strong or weak message. We propose that the majority source presumably
increased (or minority source reduced) thought confidence and as a
365 consequence, we observed an increased (or decreased) argument quality
effect on attitudes. Had our source status manipulation preceded the
message, the pattern we observed under high elaboration conditions would
likely have been attributed to greater processing of the majority versus the
minority message. Because our manipulation followed message processing
370 and elaboration was already high, we argue that a more likely explanation is
that the majority (relative to the minority) status of the source increased
10 HORCAJO, BRIN˜OL, PETTY
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confidence in the thoughts people already had to the message and caused
them to rely on them more. This interpretation would be consistent with
prior findings from Horcajo and colleagues (2010), who also showed
375 mediation through confidence on attitude change when source status
information followed processing. Thus, taken together with previous
research, it can be concluded that elaboration and timing constitute two
moderating factors of the self-validation effects in prior attitude change
research (Brin˜ol & Petty, 2009).
380 On the other hand, under a low-elaboration level, majority source status
increased persuasion compared to a minority source irrespective of
argument quality, presumably through a peripheral cue process. This is
consistent with previous research on minority influence suggesting that
source status can operate as a cue when elaboration is low and source status
385 information is available before the message (e.g., serving as quick heuristic
to persuasion or resistance: ‘‘the majority is more likely to be correct’’). To
our knowledge, the present research is the first to show that majority/
minority source status can affect persuasion by acting as a peripheral cue
even when source status information is included after a message and
390 elaboration likelihood is relatively low.
In sum, although prior research has shown that the placement or timing in
which the source information is introduced (i.e., prior to vs after the
message) can moderate the effects and underlying processes of source factors
such as numerical source status (Horcajo et al., 2010) or source credibility
395 (Tormala et al. 2007), the present research explored empirically a different
variable (extent of elaboration) that can moderate the impact of source
factors in persuasion when source information follows message processing.
Although previous research demonstrated that extent of elaboration can
moderate processes of first-order cognition (use of cues vs biasing thinking)
400 when manipulated prior to message processing (Martin et al., 2007), it did
not provide any evidence for the moderating role of elaboration when source
status follows the message. Thus the current study reveals that elaboration
can moderate other processes (use of cues vs use of thoughts) when
introduced after message processing.
405 Despite the novel contributions of the present research, some questions
deserve further attention. First, although the predicted pattern of results for
high-elaboration participants was consistent with a self-validation explana-
tion, other possible explanations might be considered. For example, the
effects of majority/minority source status on attitudes could be due to
410 participants in the majority source status condition engaging in increased
message processing after the message, which would in turn lead to the
obtained argument quality effect. This alternative explanation seems
implausible for a number of reasons. First, most past research has shown
that when amount of thinking is affected by source status it is often
SOURCE STATUS AFTER MESSAGE 11
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415 minorities that trigger more extensive discrimination between strong and
weak arguments (e.g., Horcajo et al., 2010; Martin & Hewstone, 2008; see
Baker & Petty, 1994; Martin & Hewstone, 2003, for exceptions). The
message used in the current study was not counter-attitudinal and did not
include a negative personal outcome (the specific conditions in which
420 majority status has been found previously to increase message processing),
thus, it seems unlikely that majority (vs minority) status resulted in an
increase in message processing.
Second, no effect of the majority/minority source status was apparent on
the measure of perceived attention. Although this finding represents a null
425 effect, the measure we used has proven sensitive to differences in elaboration
in similar studies (e.g., Brin˜ol & Petty, 2003) and proved sensitive to
detecting the impact of the elaboration manipulation in this study.
Nevertheless, future research should include more complete measures of
elaboration and also register cognitive responses. However, given this lack
430 of effect on the current measure of perceived attention, we argue that
participants in the majority and minority source status conditions were not
likely to differ in their degree of elaboration. Rather, the extent of attention
was only a function of the manipulation of elaboration. Finally, as noted
before, it is important to highlight again that source status was induced after
435 information processing in the present research. Thus it is unlikely that
participants’ amount of thinking was affected by the source status
manipulation.
Another potential alternative explanation would be that the quality of the
arguments led participants to generate expectations about the numerical
440 status of the source. According to this possibility, after receiving strong
arguments people will expect the source to be in the majority, whereas after
receiving weak arguments people will expect the source to have a minority
status. Although plausible, this matching interpretation would predict a
pattern of results different to the ones observed in the present study, and
445 would not account of the moderating role of elaboration. For example, this
interpretation would predict that participants who received weak arguments
from a minority source would show the lowest persuasion. However,
participants who received weak arguments showed more persuasion for a
minority than a majority status source, consistent with the idea that the
450 minority source reduced reliance on the (negative) thoughts likely generated
to the message.
In sum, the present research examined the multiple processes by which
source factors can produce persuasion when induced after thinking and this
is important for several reasons. First, this research shows that some of the
455 roles that source status plays after a message are the same as played before
the message (i.e., peripheral cue processes), but some roles are different (i.e.,
self-validation). Second, because numerical source status affected attitudes
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by two different processes as a function of elaboration, we were able to
obtain different persuasion outcomes for the same variable. Thus these
460 results suggest that majority/minority source status can increase or decrease
persuasion depending on the underlying process by which they operate when
induced after the message.
Furthermore, the ELM holds that the process by which an attitude is
formed or changed is consequential for the strength of the attitude (Petty &
465 Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, even if two different processes result in the same
extent of persuasion, the consequences of this persuasion can differ. For
example, when variables such as source status produce persuasion through
low thinking processes (e.g., serving as a peripheral cue) the attitudes formed
are less persistent, resistant to change, and predictive of behavior than when
470 the same amount of change is produced by source status via high thinking
processes (e.g., validating thoughts; Brin˜ol & Petty, 2009; see also Martin &
Hewstone, 2008). Thus understanding the processes by which variables such
as source status have their impact is important because it is informative
about both the immediate and the long-term consequences of persuasion.
475 Applied to the present research, one could argue that the persuasive effect
obtained for the majority source status would likely be more impactful and
predictive of behavior when it results from the validation of positive
thoughts under high thinking conditions than when it emerges from the
operation of a simple heuristic under low thinking conditions.
480 In addition to the theoretical rationale previously described, the present
study has several implications for the potential applicability of these results
to real-life situations. For example, regarding the placement of source status
information, the introduction of the majority/minority source information
(prior to vs after a persuasive proposal) makes sense in natural settings
485 because many life situations often involve thinking about issues before
learning the opinions of other people. However there are also relevant
situations in which source status information is learned following thinking.
For example, following the analysis of a proposal (e.g., advertising, political
issue . . .), another person could make salient whether many or few others
490 agree. In these circumstances the source status information will follow the
proposal and, according to the present research, the different effects on
judgment could be understood in terms of a self-validation process (under
high-elaboration conditions) or a peripheral cue mechanism (under low-
elaboration conditions). Therefore people who are familiar with our
495 research on the importance of timing and elaboration could strategically
reveal the majority or minority status of source to achieve the better
persuasive effects. In fact, although majority source status could generally
produce more persuasion, our present study showed that majority source
status can decrease persuasion under some circumstances. As shown in the
500 present study this would be the case when majority source status
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information is introduced following a message composed by weak
arguments and recipients are under high-elaboration conditions.
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